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I. INTRODUCTION
STEPHEN R. MILLER*
This collection of essays arose from presentations made by participants at the
inaugural meeting of the Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West held at the Sun Valley
Lodge in Ketchum, Idaho, on November 13 th and 14th, 2014. The topic chosen for this
first Symposium was Transmission and Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. and
Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map. The topic was purposefully large in scope,
engaging as many energy sectors and as much of the western U.S. and Canada as possible.
The proceedings of this meeting, in turn, will inform future meetings of the Symposium
series that will focus on more defined, particularized aspects of western energy
production and use.
The Symposium began with two panels that explored energy infrastructural choices
that the western U.S. and Canada currently face. Sam Kalen, University of Wyoming
College of Law, spoke on law’s role in embedding choices in the energy landscape, as
well as the nature of a resilient legal architecture necessary to facilitate today’s lowcarbon preferences. Tara Righetti, also of the University of Wyoming College of Law,
then discussed flaring rules related to natural gas exploration in the west. She also
discussed how those changes may influence the expansion of natural gas transportation
and storage infrastructures in the west. K.K. Duvivier, Sturm College of Law, University
of Denver, discussed several problems related to the distribution of wind resources and
proposed several solutions. Troy Rule, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona
State University, offered thoughts on utilities and the market for rooftop solar generation.
Don Howell, chief legal counsel for the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, discussed one
state’s complications in integrating renewables into its energy portfolio.
The Symposium then turned to a discussion of the potential impacts of the Clean
Air Act section 111(d) Clean Power Plan, which was led by Melissa Powers, Lewis and
Clark Law School. Issues raised in Prof. Powers’ session were continued in the
Symposium’s afternoon sessions, which were dedicated to western regional energy
planning. Three attorneys from the Green Energy Institute at the Lewis and Clark Law
School presented on a variety of energy planning issues. Nick Lawton discussed
promoting renewable energy development on public lands; Amelia Schlusser discussed
the Clean Power Plan’s implications for the western grid; and Nate Larsen discussed how
utility reforms in Hawaii and New York could ultimately have implications on the
Northwest’s electricity industry.
The theme of western regional energy planning was continued into the
Symposium’s last panel. John Fazio, a senior power systems analyst for the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council, discussed the Council’s current progress on the
Seventh Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan. David Solan, Boise State
University, discussed the creation of energy imbalance markets across the western United
States.
All of the Symposium’s presentations were live-streamed on the Internet and have
been archived on the Symposium website where they may be viewed for free.1 The essays

*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
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that follow are presented in the order of the authors’ presentations at the Symposium, and
thus roughly move through the Symposium’s major themes of energy infrastructure
choices and western regional energy planning. Collectively, these essays provide a
notable introduction to leading issues facing western energy law today.
A brief word is due on the nature of the Symposium. The Idaho Symposium on
Energy in the West is a new interdisciplinary collaboration between the University of
Idaho College of Law Natural Resources and Environmental Law Program; the Center
for Advanced Energy Studies at Idaho National Laboratories; and the Energy Policy
Institute at Boise State University. The three collaborating institutions plan to hold a
meeting of the Symposium series on an annual basis with the hope of providing a new
intellectual resource for energy law and policy in the west. In even years, it is anticipated
that the Symposium will be a large, public-facing event suitable for scholars, industry
professionals, and practicing lawyers. In odd years, the Symposium is anticipated to
convene as a smaller, scholarly event with the goal of providing a collaborative
environment to advance law and policy scholarship on energy issues. The next
Symposium meeting is planned for Spring, 2016.
Finally, many thanks go to my co-organizer of the Symposium series, Barbara
Cosens, University of Idaho College of Law, who has proven a valuable mentor in this
and other projects over the years.

Contributors’ Note: Funding for the Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West was generously provided
by the Center for Advanced Energy Studies at Idaho National Laboratory (CAES). In particular, thanks go
to Dr. Steven Aumeier, Director of Energy Systems and Technologies, Idaho National Laboratory, and
Michael Hagood, Director, Program Development, Energy and Environment Science and Technology, Idaho
National Laboratory, both of whom gave generously of their time in framing this event, as well as the
Symposium series generally. Many at the University of Idaho were essential to the Symposium’s success.
Foremost among them is Jack McIver, Vice President for Research at the University of Idaho, who assisted
in procuring funds for the Symposium and also provided administrative assistance from his office. At the
University of Idaho, College of Law, the creation of the Symposium spanned the tenure of three deans—
former Dean Donald Burnett, Interim Dean Michael Satz, and current Dean Mark Adams—each of whom
supported the Symposium’s creation in spirit and also by providing administrative resources from the College.
Thanks also go to Dr. David Solan, Assistant Professor, Boise State University Department of Public Policy
and Administration and Director of the Energy Policy Institute at Boise State University, for his assistance in
framing the discussion. Many thanks go to Eric White and Eric Fredback at the University of Idaho, as well
as Donna Wuthrich at CAES, each of whom provided tremendous administrative, accounting, and technical
assistance in helping three institutions work together for the first time. Finally, thanks go to the staff at the
Sun Valley Lodge—and, in particular, Tayt Knowles and Michael Hoover—who assisted us in hosting a
terrific event despite the unexpected blizzard that accompanied this first meeting of the Symposium series.
1. Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West, UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW,
http://www.uidaho.edu/law/news/upcoming-events/energy-in-the-west (last visited Ocotober 25, 2015).
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II. EMBEDDED CHOICES: A RESILIENT ENERGY LEGAL ARCHITECTURE
SAM KALEN**
Fortune Magazine, in 1955, included an array of projections for what our society
might look like by 1980: One projection was that homes might be powered by atomic
units, with energy virtually free—suggested no less by the then head of the atomic energy
commission. A little over ten years ago, our dialogues focused on peak oil and the need
for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG); today, policy-makers talk about exports, for
oil, coal, and LNG. In just a few short years, crude-by-rail has gone from being barely
mentioned to almost a crisis conversation to address too many train accidents. 2 Within
roughly a decade and half, as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling has opened up
natural gas resources across the country, the natural gas industry has witnessed the rise
of the midstream transportation company—without a corresponding structure to ensure
the safety of these new lines.3 Energy, in short, is not just fluid; it is exceedingly dynamic
and unpredictable. When, therefore, we engage in a dialogue about “Transmission and
Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. & Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map to
2050,”4 the subject of this symposium, we first ought to appreciate how choices in our
laws might become embedded and yet inconsistent with the dynamic nature of energy
markets and technology.
This short essay, consequently, suggests that our existing legal architecture lacks
the resilience necessary to respond effectively to a dynamic energy market and emerging
technologies. It briefly reviews how some of those choices have unfolded in the past, how
the conversations today recognize that we lack a capable architecture, and then why the
dialogues of today focus too much on either specifics or theory rather than constructing
a resilient legal architecture for the future.
Our ability to establish workable structures capable of accommodating an everchanging economy and technology has proven remarkably poor. The Supreme Court and
Congress developed legal structures by looking in a rear view mirror, with little
appreciation for how quickly or in what manner changes might occur in the road ahead.
** Winston Howard Distinguished Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. The
author would like to thank the participants at the symposium for their helpful questions and comments.
2. See High Prairie Pipeline, LLC v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. P’ship, 149 FERC P 61,004, 61,013
(Oct. 1, 2014) (stating that crude-by-rail is an analogue of what some claim is a problem with the
administration of crude oil pipelines under the Interstate Commerce Act and the inability of some companies
to transport their produce over third party lines); Spate of Oil Train Accidents May Up Pressure on White
House,
GREENWIRE
(Feb.
27,
2015)
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060014172/search?keyword=spate+of+oil+train+accidents; see
also Jad Mouawad, Bakken Crude, Rolling Through Albany, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/business/energy-environment/bakkan-crude-rolling-throughalbany.html?_r=0
3. See Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,086, 53,086–88
(Aug. 25, 2011); see also U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-667, OIL AND GAS
TRANSPORTATION: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IS TAKING ACTIONS TO ADDRESS RAIL SAFETY, BUT
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE PIPELINE SAFETY (2014) (noting growing risk of federally
unregulated gathering pipelines); THE INGAA FOUNDATION, INC., NORTH AMERICAN MIDSTREAM
INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: CAPITALIZING ON OUR ENERGY ABUNDANCE (2014) (discussing growth
of midstream infrastructure).
4. The symposium topic corresponds well with the First of the President’s Quadrennial Energy
Review, pursuant to the January 9, 2014 Presidential Memorandum, on “Energy Transmission, Storage, and
Distribution.”
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When the Supreme Court first established, during the pre-New Deal era, seemingly easily
identifiable spheres of jurisdiction between state and federal authority, 5 neither the
assumptions about the nature of electricity nor the market would survive more than
another few decades.6 The 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act, 7 responding to a
perceived failure of the market to arrest market concentration by natural monopolies,
ultimately impeded the development of innovative and progressive utilities, a problem
well understood by the 1980s but not fully corrected until the Energy Policy Act of 2005.8
The energy crisis of the 1970s prompted an array of discrete programs, collectively
referred to as President Carter’s National Energy Policy, but it too was far from a national
energy policy and lacked sufficient consistency with emerging environmental principles. 9
Congress, for instance, passed the National Gas Policy Act of 1978,10 with an assumption
that proved inaccurate only to be corrected by the Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989.11
Each of these programs and others created embedded choices that cabined innovation and
flexibility.
We again are on the cusp of pretending that our legal institutions are prescient
enough to craft sufficiently precise rules to carry our energy economy forward for longer
than a few years. The undeniable urgency of transitioning to a low carbon economy has
produced a fugue of commentary on how to incorporate renewable energy resources into
the electric grid,12 but, as with the debate now between Tesla’s electric car and Toyota’s
push for hydrogen fuel cell cars,13 it seems foolhardy to believe that our legal institutions
have the capacity to canvass existing R&D programs and calculate which ones will
succeed. After all, it is almost universally accepted that, if battery storage on a large and
reliable scale emerges, our energy markets and structure could be altered significantly.
Yet, the current dialogue about the electric grid appears poised to establish a suite
of embedded choices that may, or may not, promote a low carbon, low cost, flexible, and
reliable grid. To begin with, the jurisdictional paradigm from the Federal Power Act
allocating authority between the states and the federal government is marginally
5. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927). In
response, Congress passed the 1935 Federal Power Act, amending the 1920 Federal Water Power Act. Public
Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).
6. See generally STEPHEN BREYER & PAUL MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION (1974) (stating that by the 1950s and 1960s, the need for regional coordination
(including power pools) and interconnection—almost dictating a shift toward necessary federal control—
emerged).
7. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79–79z (repealed 2005).
8. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
9. See Sam Kalen, Replacing a National Energy Policy with a National Resource Policy, 19 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 9, 13 (2005).
10. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (which sought to correct
the resulting effects of the Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954),
extending federal control over producer wellhead sales for resale of natural gas flowing into the interstate
market).
11. Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Symposium, Greening the Grid: Building a Legal Framework for Carbon Neutrality,
39 ENVTL. L. 927 (2009); see also Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC
Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2014); Albert C. Lin, Lessons from the
Past for Assessing Energy Technologies for the Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1814 (2014).
13. Drew Harwell, Meet the Fast-Charging, Affordable ‘Future’ Car That Elon Musk Hates,
WASH. POST., Feb. 25, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/02/25/meet-thefast-charging-affordable-future-car-that-elon-musk-hates/.
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workable.14 States, such as those impacted by Hurricane Sandy, want to ensure that they
have sufficient say in capacity markets (available electric generation), and are now
engaged in a dialogue with the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) about
their ability to intrude into areas FERC considers within its domain.15 Similarly, issues
associated with allocating authority over the administration of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 are once again surfacing with increasing frequency as
smaller renewable energy resources push to come on line.16 And perhaps, more
importantly, it is not yet settled whether FERC or the states can require demand response
(efficiency in the grid by downstream consumers).17 Considerable scholarly commentary,
therefore, favors the need for new governance structures that would smooth the
jurisdictional divide between the states and the federal government. 18
But such a dialogue assumes that we know whether a national, regional, or local
generation and distribution market is best suited for future technologies. Admittedly, with
the advent of regional transmission organizations and independent system operators, 19
along with FERC supervised reliability standards and the importance of balancing
authorities for the grid (and push toward organized markets), 20 we may well have
established sufficiently embedded choices favoring a regionally structured governance
model. That, in turn, for example, could impede the penetration of distributed generation.
For instance, in California, proponents of distributed solar generation suggest that the
emergence of the large-scale utility solar projects unwisely perpetuates the old energy
model of large generation resources situated away from the load.21
14. An excellent survey of the issues was presented during the Center for Strategic & International
Studies conference on “Electricity in Transition: Technology, Markets and Regulation,” Sept. 4, 2014.
15. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 479–80 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting
Maryland’s program for encouraging new capacity in the wholesale market); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v.
Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3rd Cir. 2014) (rejecting New Jersey’s attempt to encourage new capacity into
wholesale market); CPV Shore, L.L.C., 148 FERC P 61,096, 61554 (Aug. 5, 2014) (rejecting agreements as
intruding upon FERC authority); Final Initial Brief of Petitioners People of the State of New York and the
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of the State of New York, New York v. FERC, No. 13-2316, (2nd Cir. 2014)
(distinguishing between jurisdictional local distribution facilities and FERC jurisdictional bulk power
transmission facilities).
16. See Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2014); Allco Fin. Ltd.
v. Klee, No. 15-20, 2015 WL 6774324 (2nd Cir. Nov. 6, 2015) (involving question of whether state attempt
to promote renewable resources intrudes on FERC’s authority); see also Midland Power Coop. v. FERC, 774
F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction fight over interconnection of a wind developer).
The scheduling of small renewable resources has become an issue in the northwest, as well. See PaTu Wind
Farm Takes PGE to FERC Over Transmission Scheduling, CLEARING UP, No. 1671 (Nov. 7, 2014).
17. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 2049 (May 4, 2015). The D.C. Circuit held that FERC’s effort to promote demand response
intruded upon state authority, a conclusion that the Obama Administration believes “seriously misinterpreted”
federal authority. Hannah Northey, White House Seeks Supreme Court Review of Demand Response Case,
GREENWIRE (Jan. 16, 2015). See generally Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing
Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712 (2014); Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the
Smart Grid?: FERC’s Authority over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4
SAN. DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2012–13).
18. E.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J.
Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2014).
19. See FERC, Regional Transmission Org., 89 FERC P 61,285 (1999). See also Regional
Transmission Org. (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Sept. 29, 2015).
20. See Malcolm McLellan & Carol Opatrny, Maintaining a Balance: Innovation in Power
System Balancing Authorities, 1 WASH. J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2011).
21. E.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. Edward Klump,
Even as Grid Persists, EEI Speakers Say Utilities’ Approach Must Evolve, E&E NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014),
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What I suggest we need, instead, is not another attempt to construct legal
institutions or structures (what I have been calling our legal architecture) based upon
present choices, current technologies, or the market as we envision it today, particularly
with one of the nation’s top energy experts suggesting how the nation’s utilities must
change dramatically,22 but rather a fundamental shift in the conversation. The
conversation should focus on developing an adaptive, or resilient, legal architecture that
enjoys sufficient capacity to permit clean, efficient, and reliable markets and technologies
to develop. Just as computer systems gravitated toward an open architecture, we need to
explore how to craft our next wave of energy legislation in a manner that will promote,
not retard, our shift toward a low carbon energy economy.

http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/11/13/stories/1060008812 (noting speakers’ claims that utilities
will need to change, but that distributed generation will be a part of the grid). See generally AMORY B.
LOVINS, REINVENTING FIRE: BOLD BUSINESS SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA 202–09 (2011); Sara
C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010).
22. Peter Behr, Power Industry on ‘Train Wreck’ Path, Consultant Says, E&E NEWS (Sept. 4,
2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/09/04/stories/1060005204 (describing comments of Peter
Fox-Penner of the Brattle Group).
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III. AVOIDABLY LOST23: EVOLVING THE REASONABLE USE STANDARD TO
REDUCE NATURAL GAS FLARING
TARA RIGHETTI***
In unconventional plays throughout the United States, flaring has become
ubiquitous as a means to dispose produced gas that cannot be efficiently gathered and
transported to market.24 The result is waste, lost value, and unnecessary emissions.25 The
distributed nature of unconventional resources, lack of portability of gas, and lower value
compared to oil present challenges to infrastructure investment and contribute to the
widespread utilization of flaring.26 These challenges are compounded by the uncertainty
and cost associated with obtaining right of way for gathering lines from surface
landowners.
Gas production requires a capillary like system through which gas can be gathered,
compressed, processed, and delivered to an intrastate or interstate line or point of sale. 27
Development of this type of gathering infrastructure is particularly problematic on splitestates, where property ownership of the surface and minerals is divided.28 The mineral
estate is considered “dominant” and the lessee has an implied right to use as much of the
surface as is reasonably necessary to explore for and produce the minerals and give
purpose to the grant.29 There is no prescribed list of what uses are reasonably necessary:
reasonableness is determined as a question of fact considering custom, use, and practice
in the industry.30 Over time, this standard has evolved in response to changes in
technology and regulation.31
23. The title comes from Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and
Gas Leases (NTL 4-A) U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Jan. 1, 1980)
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/ak/aktest/energy/og_forms.Par.32669.File.dat/ntl4a.pdf. I do not
suggest that gas flared for lack of infrastructure or right of way should be considered avoidably lost for
purposes of determining royalty.
***

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.

24. In 2013, forty percent of the natural gas vented or flared in the United States was in North
Dakota, much of it from oil wells in the unconventional Bakken formation. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals
and
Production,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Sept.
2015),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_vgv_mmcf_a.htm; North Dakota Natural Gas Vented
and Flared, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9040nd2m.htm.
25. Ryan Salmon & Andrew Logan, Flaring Up: North Dakota Natural Gas More than Doubles
in Two Years, CERES (2013), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/flaring-up-north-dakota-natural-gasflaring-more-than-doubles-in-two-years/view. “In 2012 alone, flaring resulted in the loss of approximately
$1 billion in fuel and the GHG emissions equivalent of adding one million cars to the road.” Id. at 3.
26. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 951 (2014).
27. Kevin A. Lawlor & Michael Conder, Gathering and Processing Design Options for
Unconventional
Gas,
MIDSTREAM
BUS.
(Apr.
1,
2013,
12:00
AM),
http://www.midstreambusiness.com/gathering-and-processing-design-options-unconventional-gas-222956.
28. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1245 (D. Wyo.
2005).
29. 4 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS, § 40:4 (3d ed.) (2014); Pulaski Oil Co.
v. Conner, 162 P. 464, 464 (Okla. 1916). This right is limited in many states by the accommodation doctrine,
which can require the mineral owner to use a less impactful alternative if one reasonably exists.
30. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals §§ 214, 290; Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553,
555 (Miss. 1962).
31. See generally Michelle Andrea Wenzel, The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development
Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607; WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK
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Dominance, however, has its limits.32 Where both the surface and minerals are
privately owned,33 courts have restricted the mineral owner’s implied easement to include
only those uses reasonably necessary to access the minerals directly underlying the
surface parcel.34 Certain field-wide infrastructure, such as wastewater disposal or
leadlines carrying off-lease production, has been found to be excessive.35 Lessees are also
prohibited in most situations from using eminent domain to construct gathering
infrastructure.36 Accordingly, lessees must secure a right of way from surface owners to
build gathering lines.37 This process is time-consuming, involves high transaction costs,
and encourages strategic opportunism by surface owners, during which time gas is flared,
energy is lost, and air pollutants are emitted. 38
The marketing of production is necessarily incident to the lessee’s ability to carry
out its rights under the lease.39 If gas can only be economically marketed through a shared
gathering system, the mineral owner’s right to surface use should evolve accordingly.
Similar to the right of lessees to dispose of off-lease water as part of secondary recovery
operations, this interpretation of the reasonable use standard would increase production
and reduce the expense of lease operations.40 This change is essential in that the mineral
producer would be considered to have the right to build gathering lines as part of
developing its asset, and thus no easement would be required.41
Adopting this approach would reduce uncertainty and encourage investment by
reducing barriers to private ordering and providing alternative remedies at law. Producers
could post bond for surface damages or to obtain an injunction or sue for damages
resulting from unreasonable delay. Several producing states have split estate laws that
provide the mineral developer with the ability move forward by posting bond when
& DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 460 (West Group, 3d ed. 2000) (“[T]he purposes may keep
up with those changes that might be reasonably anticipated for the dominant tenement—evolutionary but not
revolutionary changes”).
32. Kendor P. Jones et al., Split Estates and Surface Access Issues, LANDMAN’S LEGAL
HANDBOOK 181 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2013).
33. Development of pooled, communitized, or unitized minerals may differ. See Entek GRB, LLC
v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014); Key Operating & Equip. Inc. v. Hegar, 435
S.W.3d 794, 801 (Tex. 2014).
34. Russell v. Tex. Co., 238 F.2d 636, 644 (9th Cir. 1956).
35. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon, 737 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. App. 1987) (noting that “the gas
purchaser would not have the right to transport any other gas in the line across the surface owner’s land
without condemnation proceedings or an easement from the owner of the surface estate”); Gill v. McCollum,
311 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that disposal of wastewater from off-lease was not
permitted because the injection “must have some relation to the primary purpose of obtaining production”).
36. Valerie Chambers et al., Eminent Domain in Oil and Gas: Tax Treatment When a Pipeline
Devalues Surrounding Property, 23 S. L.J. 225, 232 (2003).
37. Bruce Kramer, The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple Surface Use Issues, Severed
Minerals, Split Estates, Rights of Access, and Surface Use in Mineral Extraction Operations 2-1 (2005),
reprinted in 44 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. J. 273 (2007).
38. See Industry to Increase Natural Gas Capture to 85 Percent Within Two Years and 90 Percent
in Six Years, N. DAKOTA PETROLEUM COUNCIL (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.ndoil.org/latest-news/newsrelease-industry-to-increase-natural-gas-capture-to-85-percent-within-two-years-and-90-percent-in-sixyears/.
39. Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. App. 1992).
40. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 446 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a lessee/operator has the right
to bring off-lease salt water on to the leased premises to increase production via injection).
41. Christopher S. Kulander, Surface Damages, Site-Remediation and Well Bonding in
Wyoming—Results and Analysis of Recent Regulation, 9 WYO. L. REV. 413, 421 (2009).
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negotiations fail.42 Bonding-on is limited to uses considered within the scope of the
implied right of access.43 As such, gathering facilities do not necessarily qualify for
bonding-on or arbitration provisions under those laws. Even in states without split-estate
laws, a surface owner can be liable for damages, such as standby rig time, resulting from
its obstruction of the mineral owner’s reasonable surface use.44 Were gathering lines
considered within the scope of the implied easement, mineral owners could pursue claims
for the lost value of flared gas and for any fines, penalties, or royalty assessed on flared
gas during the period of delay. While mineral lessees rarely avail themselves of these
remedies,45 the possibility may reduce uncertainty and deter strategic behavior.
Protecting the private property rights of the surface owner against unreasonable use
remains critical. Expanding the scope of the easement does not obviate the custom, or
requirement under most split-estate acts, to compensate the surface owner for damages. 46
Allowing off-lease production to cross the land justifiably expands the scope of the
limited easement granted to the mineral owner,47 and compensation could be
correspondingly increased. The nexus between the use and underlying minerals must also
be preserved: where the property is not included in an exploratory unit, any gathering line
crossing the property would have to carry some gas produced from parcel. To do
otherwise would risk the surface owner being subject to any use that conceivably
improved the economics of the entire operations of the producer, without necessarily
relating to the dominant parcel itself.
Flaring and venting that results from failures in private ordering to allow
construction of gathering lines demonstrates the limitations of the current implied
easement for mineral development to address the realities associated with unconventional
and dispersed resources. It is necessary to preserve the flexibility of the mineral owner’s
rights of access to absorb evolutionary changes in response to new resources and new
technologies or to provide alternate means of obtaining access through eminent domain.
If we fail to do so, we can be certain that energy will continue to be avoidably lost.

42. Id. at 426.
43. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402 (2014).
44. See generally Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1980); Montfort v. Trek Res., Inc., 198
S.W.3d 344 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
45. A review of split estate bonds posted in Wyoming since passage of the split estate act indicates
that mineral developers bond-on in less than two percent of wells permitted. See WYO. OIL AND GAS
CONSERVATION COMM’N, wogcc.state.wy.us (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
46. Andrew M. Miller, Comment, A Journey Through Mineral Estate Dominance, the
Accommodation Doctrine, and Beyond: Why Texas is Ready to Take the Next Step with a Surface Damage
Act, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 461, 464 (2003).
47. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (holding that deed
reservation did not authorize mineral owner to increase the burden on the surface estate for the benefit of
additional lands).
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IV. WIND–SCATTERED RESOURCES
K.K. DUVIVIER****
Like Olympic contenders vying for the first-place podium, the United States and
China have competed for the top spot in wind production since Germany lost that title in
2009.48 Although China has more installed capacity, 49 the United States became the
world’s number one producer of wind in 2013.50 So the good news is that the United
States has ample reserves—enough to power the entire current U.S. electricity demand
twelve times over.51 Furthermore, the incentives to develop this climate-friendly source
of electricity are strong—not only is it encouraged by state-enacted Renewable Portfolio
Standards,52 but in some instances wind is also the most cost-effective source of
electricity generation.53
Despite these pluses, one fundamental trait plagues wind development and puts it
at a colossal disadvantage against its fossil fuel competitors. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has charitably called it “location constrained,” 54 but in
more blunt terms wind suffers from being a scattered resource. Some of the best U.S.
wind reserves occur in a swath through the deep mid-belly of the country, in states like

**** Professor of Law, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. The author would like to
thank Mark Safty for his feedback and her research assistant, Levi Stubbs, for his work on this piece.
48. K.K. DuVivier, The Renewable Energy Reader, U. DENVER LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO.
11–19, (2011). Since 2009, U.S. wind energy capacity grew from approximately 25,000 MW to 61,000 MW.
Wind Generation Records & Turbine Productivity, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
http://www.awea.org/Issues/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5806&RDtoken=22166&userID= (last visited
Nov. 24, 2015).
49. Global Installed Wind Power Capacity (MW) – Regional Distribution, GLOBAL WIND
ENERGY
COUNCIL,
http://www.gwec.net/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/GLOBAL_INSTALLED_WIND_POWER_CAPACITY_MW_%E2%80%93_R
egional_Distribution.jpg (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). Ironically, Chinese wind projects also suffer from a lack
of transmission to connect scattered resources to load centers. Kat Cheung, Integration of Renewables: Status
and
Challenges
in
China,
INT’L
ENERGY
AGENCY
(2011),
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Integration_of_Renewables.pdf.
50. Electric
Power
Monthly,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
(2014),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_1_a. The United States produced
167,840 million megawatt hours in 2013. Id.
51. Electric
Power
Monthly,
U.S.
Energy
Info.
Admin.,
(2014),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_es1b; Anthony Lopez et al., Nat’l
Renewable Energy Lab., U.S. Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis, iv (2012),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/51946.pdf.
52. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850.
53. “Wind prices are extremely competitive right now, offering lower costs than other possible
resources, like natural gas plants. These projects offer a great hedge against rising and often volatile fuel
prices.” David Sparby, president & CEO of Xcel Energy’s Northern States Power announcing 600MW of
new wind power contracts on July 16, 2013. The Cost of Wind Energy in the U.S., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5547#ComparativeCost (last visited Nov. 24,
2015).
54. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 119 F.E.R.C. P 61,061 (2007); see also Heidi Werntz, Let’s
Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 421 n.10 (2011).
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North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Kansas, and Iowa. 55 Ironically, these
are also some of the states with the lowest populations and electricity demands. 56
Unlike other sources of energy that might be shipped by rail or barge, wind power
can only be transported by transmission line. So what makes matters worse for scattered
wind resources is that these wind-rich states are located in the no-man’s-land of the
unconnected divide between the three major U.S. transmission interconnections.57 While
first-generation wind farms could be built near existing transmission, further
development of an energy superhighway is crucial to connect U.S. wind power reserves
to load centers.58
The federal government has attempted to address the scattered resources problem
with both funding and policy measures. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 directed $3.4 billion dollars to modernizing the U.S. transmission grid. 59 In
addition, FERC orders, primarily addressing siting authority and cost allocation, sought
to encourage regional and interregional cooperation by breaking down barriers
perpetuating parochial approaches to transmission development.
But the FERC solutions have been frustrating. First, courts have not upheld FERC’s
transmission siting authority. 60 Second, Order 1000, which allows FERC to guide
allocation formulas to help determine rates on a regional instead of a localized basis, has
now been recognized by a federal court.61 However, that authority was vehemently
resisted by sixty-one vested entities, “includ[ing] state regulatory agencies, electric
transmission providers, regional transmission organizations, and electric industry trade
associations”62 that are “weighing their options” after the most recent ruling and “are
55. United States—Wind Resource Map, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB., (May 6, 2009), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/US-50m-wind-power-map.jpg. The rankings for best
wind resources is as follows: 1) North Dakota; 2) Texas; 3) Kansas; 4) South Dakota; 5) Montana; 6)
Nebraska; 7) Wyoming; 8) Oklahoma; 9) Minnesota; and 10) Iowa. Megan Phelps, The Best States for Wind
Power, MOTHER EARTH NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.motherearthnews.com/renewable-energy/windresources-united-states.aspx.
56. Electricity
Consumption
by
State,
UNIV.
OF
KAN.,
(2013),
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/ksdata/ksah/energy/18ener7.pdf. Excluding Texas from the states with the best
resources, because of its size and its being its own interconnection, the top nine states account for 39.9% of
the total installed wind power, and only consume about 9% of the electricity in the United States annually.
Id.;
Installed
Wind
Capacity,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY
(July
27,
2015),
http://apps2.eere.energy.gov/wind/windexchange/wind_installed_capacity.asp.
57. Because of differing frequencies and lack of connections, there is virtually no electricity
transfer between the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and Ercot, which serves only
Texas. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1808. “Within each subregion, the electric network is highly
interconnected and interdependent, but there is no capacity to move electricity between these three
subregions.” Id.
58. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n & Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n, Green Power Superhighways:
Building
a
Path
to
America’s
Clean
Energy
Future
3
(2009),
https://www.awea.org/files/FileDownloads/pdfs/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf.
59. Werntz, supra note 54, at 422.
60. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 309–10 (4th Cir. 2009); see also David A.
King, Interregional Coordination of Electric Transmission and Its Impact on Texas Wind, 8 TEX. J. OIL, GAS,
& ENERGY L. 309, 327 (2012–13) (citing Cal. Wilderness Coal v. DOE, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011)); Uma
Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 261 (2011); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving
Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1405, 1417–19 (2010).
61. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, No. 12-1232, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19968 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
17, 2014) (denying the petition for rehearing en banc) (effectively upholding F.E.R.C.’s power under
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities); Order
No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 1000].
62. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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likely in the future” to mount “[s]ignificant [additional] challenges to the scope of
FERC’s granted power under [Order 1000]….”63
Perhaps most significantly, the challenges to FERC’s authority have created delays
in the development of Regional Transmission Organization [RTO] lines. 64 By some
estimates, the average timeline for a transmission project is seven years. 65 The FERC
1000 court challenges added four years to the front end of that process, and future
challenges to FERC authority may push starts back even further.
In addition, FERC 1000 does not mandate interconnection-wide transmission
planning,66 but instead relies on voluntary agreement from beneficiaries. 67 As a scattered
resource, wind creates generation and consumption markets across state lines with
especially contentious negotiations because the costs and “benefits of the proposed
project may accrue unevenly to market participants.’”68 Thus, cost allocation remains one
of the biggest challenges facing interstate transmission development. 69 Even with
increased FERC authority, the lengthy cost-allocation negotiations at the front end of the
development process may push back the time to start the regulatory and permitting
phases, delaying new transmission capacity for more than a decade.
In this environment, the alternative of private merchant lines has become
increasingly attractive.70 In contrast to the incremental steps that FERC has been able to
achieve, the merchant-line process allows a jump start to transmission construction. One
advantage for merchant developers is that they build transmission independently from
incumbent utilities. Thus, the private merchant alternative does not require transforming
and reworking traditional power structures.71
Merchant lines are also able to circumvent the lengthy and difficult cost-allocation
process. Private parties put up the capital for merchant line construction and recoup their
investment through services charges. Because they do not serve “captive retail
customers” as utilities do, these merchant developers have “the right to charge for
transmission service at negotiated rates, unencumbered by the traditional cost of service
ratemaking principles and filings usually applied to transmission service.” 72
As a result, several merchant transmission lines appear to be closer to fruition than
RTO lines. A few examples include the SunZia Southwest project, scheduled to begin in

63. Recent Developments in Texas, United States, and International Energy Law, 10 TEX. J. OIL,
GAS, & ENERGY L. 213, 253 (2014).
64. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1870–72.
65. RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION ROADMAP, W. GOVERNOR’S ASS’N 6 (2010),
http://www.westgov.org/images/dmdocuments/TransmissionRoadMap2010.pdf.
66. Order 1000, supra note 61, at 49,942 (“The Commission is not requiring either
interconnectionwide planning or interconnectionwide cost allocation.”).
67. Order 1000, supra note 61, at 49,860.
68. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1870 (quoting Sari Fink et al., National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Methodologies for Regional Transmission
Organizations 2 (2011), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49880.pdf).
69. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1870.
70. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1120–31
(2013) (comparing the “private independent [merchant] transmission lines” and traditional public utility lines
in the context of eminent domain).
71. See Werntz, supra note 54, at 424–26.
72. Werntz, supra note 54, at 425.
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2015;73 the Zephyr Transmission project, scheduled to begin construction in 2017; 74 and
the TransWest Express Transmission project, due to begin construction in 2015. 75 In
addition, some of these markets seem competitive as alternative private proposals have
been made for some of the same routes.76
In conclusion, wind power’s scattered nature will continue to challenge its
development until transmission construction conundrums can be resolved. Expanding
FERC’s authority may provide many long-term benefits for RTO lines, but continued
delays threaten effective development.77 Merchant lines may have their problems,78 but
currently these private sector solutions appear to be the more efficient solution for
funding transmission lines to scattered wind resources.

73. The SunZia Southwest Transmission Project is the first of the Rapid Response Team for
Transmission (RRTT) projects to receive Department of Interior approval for its Right of Way. ETRANS
FEDERAL
PERMITTING
TRANSMISSION
TRACKING
SYSTEM,
http://trackingsystem.niscllc.com/etrans/utility/Search.seam. After receiving the green light from the federal government, SunZia
projected an early 2016 start date for construction. Zachary Ziegler, Power Line Project Gets Final Federal
Permit, ARIZ. PUB. MEDIA (Jan. 27, 2015), https://news.azpm.org/p/news-spots/2015/1/27/55220-powerline-project-gets-final-federal-permit/. However, the project must still receive approval from the New Mexico
and Arizona state land boards and hit a snag in New Mexico where one official put the process temporarily
on hold for further review. Staci Matlock, Land Commissioner Delays SunZia Transmission Line for Further
Review,
SANTA
FE
NEW
MEXICAN
(Jan.
29,
2015),
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/land-commissioner-delays-sunzia-transmission-linefor-further-review/article_acb099d0-7512-53b2-9b1c-f65222d28680.html.
74. Zephyr
Power
Transmission
Project,
DUKE AM. TRANSMISSION CO.,
http://www.datcllc.com/projects/zephyr/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). Not one of the seven pilot projects
undertaken by the Rapid Response Team for Transmission, but on a similar schedule as the large pilot
merchant projects. Id.; Coordination of Federal Transmission Permitting on Federal Lands (216(H)),
ENERGY.GOV,
http://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-andimplementation/transmission-planning/coordination (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
75. Delivering Wyoming Wind Energy to the West, TRANSWEST EXPRESS, LLC,
http://www.transwestexpress.net/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
76. Nathanael Massey, Renewable Energy: Private Transmission Ventures Aim to Send Wyo.’s
Wind Power South, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059975650
(noting that multiple lines are being proposed and constructed to carry Wyoming wind to the southwestern
states).
77. In addition, FERC 1000 has limited application, “only appl[ying] to jurisdictional public
utilities, which include only the investor-owned utilities, and the RTOs which manage them under the Federal
Power Act. This would include only approximately less than 200 entities among the approximately 3,000
utilities in the U.S.” Steven Ferrey, Pentagon Preemption: The 5-Sided Loss of State Energy and Power, 2014
U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 393, 420 (2014).
78. E.g., Recent Rulings from FERC, 4080 PUR Util. Reg. News 4 (July 27, 2012) (describing
FERC decisions in favor of incumbent utilities as opposed to “merchant transmission developers regarding
ownership and the right to build newly planned lines or related grid-related facilities”); Kevin B. Jones, David
Clarke & James Parmelee, The LMP Model: Bottlenecking Merchant Transmission, 141 No. 8 Pub. Util.
Fort. 35 (Apr. 15, 2003) (describing pricing and contract issues that are necessary to incentivize market-based
solutions).
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V. UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES: WHY UTILITIES DON’T BELONG IN
ROOFTOP SOLAR MARKETS
TROY A. RULE*****
Distributed solar energy development has increased exponentially in the United
States over the past decade. Much of this development has come in the form of
photovoltaic (“PV”) solar panel installations on the rooftops of homes and small
businesses. A combination of government incentive programs and falling PV prices has
made these rooftop solar energy systems an increasingly attractive investment for electric
utility customers throughout the country. 79
Although most rooftop solar energy companies surely welcome this coming-of-age
of their industry, many electric utilities understandably take a less favorable view of it.
Utility customers with rooftop solar panels tend to purchase far less electricity from their
utilities than customers who have no solar panels. Consequently, the recent growth of
distributed solar energy is beginning to adversely impact utilities’ revenues.
Unfortunately for utilities, a strategy of increasing electricity rates to offset revenue
growth reductions resulting from the emergence of rooftop solar technologies might well
exacerbate rather than mitigate the problem. Such rate increases serve only to make
rooftop solar power more cost-competitive with grid-supplied electricity and thereby
prompt even more customers to go solar.
With few other places to turn for additional revenue, utilities could eventually find
themselves in what some have labeled a “death spiral”: a pattern in which electricity rates
climb ever higher, prompting ever more customers to install their own distributed solar
energy systems.80 In the worst-case version of this pattern, the spiral of rising electricity
rates and increasing rooftop solar panel installations accelerates until the utility ultimately
sinks into insolvency.
Many utilities throughout the country are understandably seeking for ways to
address the growing threats that distributed solar energy technologies pose to their longterm survival. Over the past few years, numerous utilities in the United States have
advocated for policy reforms that, if implemented, would unquestionably slow the pace
of rooftop solar energy installations in their territories. These reform proposals have taken
***** Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law. Many thanks to attendees at the Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West for their valuable comments
on the issues covered in this article.
79. For information about the recent growth of rooftop solar energy, see generally SOLAR
MARKET INSIGHT REPORT 2014 Q1, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, (2014), http://www.seia.org/researchresources/solar-market-insight-report-2014-q1 (noting that the United States “installed 1,330 MWdc of solar
PV in Q1 2014, up 79% over Q1 2013, making it the second-largest quarter for solar installations in the
history of the market”).
80. See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-ityourself-power.html?_r=0 (stating that, “[a]s utilities put a heavier burden on fewer customers, it increases
the appeal for them to turn their roofs over to solar panels” and that “[u]tility executives call this a ‘death
spiral’”); Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 22, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304773104579270362739732266 (noting some investors’
concerns about a “looming ‘death spiral’ for utilities, “with solar power as the culprit”).
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a wide variety of forms, from increasing the fixed portion of customers’ utility bills to
imposing special fees on solar energy users to reducing customers’ benefits under net
metering programs. A few utilities have found some limited success in pursuing these
types of reforms. However, most utilities are still searching for new ways to shore up
their long-term stability against a rising tide of distributed solar technologies.
Interestingly, a small number of utilities have recently begun experimenting with
an entirely new, “if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em” sort of response to the rapid rise of
distributed solar. This type of strategy is manifest in a handful of newly-proposed projects
that would essentially allow utilities to directly compete as producers in private rooftop
solar markets. Perhaps most notable among these projects is the one announced in 2014
by the investor-owned utility Arizona Public Service Co. (“APS”), which services more
than one million customers in Arizona. Under its plan, APS will lease rooftop space from
1,500 residential households in exchange for a $30 per month credit on those households’
electricity bills.81 APS will then contract with private companies to install solar PV
systems on all 1,500 rooftops. APS will own all of the solar panels involved in the project
and the electricity the panels generate, which will flow directly onto the grid. Importantly,
the $30 bill credit APS is offering to customers under its plan exceeds the average
monthly net utility bill savings APS customers can presently get by purchasing or leasing
rooftop solar panels in the private market and thereby buying less power from the utility. 82
In other words, the APS plan will undercut pricing in the competitive private rooftop solar
energy market within its territory, giving customers little economic reason to go solar
through any entity other than APS.
Shortly after APS released its proposed rooftop solar plan, Tucson Electric Power
(“TEP”)—a different investor-owned utility that also operates in Arizona—proposed a
very similar sort of project. Under TEP’s proposed plan, residential customers would
lease their rooftop space to the utility in exchange for the right to lock in a fixed price for
grid-delivered electric power for 25 years.83 Like APS, TEP anticipates hiring local
contractors to install solar PV systems on the rooftops of the homes of customers who
enroll but TEP would own the systems and all of the power they generate. Comparable
utility proposals have recently been floated in other states as well.
What are the potential long-term consequences of allowing utilities to compete
directly within the rooftop solar energy market through these types of programs? And
what sorts of considerations should inform policy decisions relating to this trend? Policies
81. The APS proposal initially involved 3,000 rooftops but was later reduced to 1,500. See
generally Ryan Randazzo, APS Wants to Put Free Solar Panels on 3,000 Homes, AZ CENTRAL (July 28,
2014),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/07/28/aps-wants-put-free-solar-panelshomes/13299121/ [hereinafter Randazzo, APS Proposal] (describing the APS proposal); Ryan Randazzo,
APS
Will
Move
Ahead
with
Free
Solar,
AZ CENTRAL
(Dec.
19,
2014),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/12/19/aps-will-move-ahead-free-solar/20670299/
(noting that the project received state utility commission approval but for only 1,500 homes rather than 3,000
homes). Additional information about the APS rooftop solar proposal is also posted on the utility’s web page
at
http://www.aps.com/en/ourcompany/aboutus/investmentinrenewableenergy/Pages/
azsun.aspx?src=azsun.
82. See Randazzo, APS Proposal, supra note 81 (noting that, when APS utility customers lease
panels from the private rootop solar company SolarCity, “their new, lower power bills combined with the
lease payments bring about $5 to $10 a month in savings for customers”).
83. See Robert Walton, Tucson Electric Power Proposes New Utility-Owned Rooftop Solar
Program, UTILITYDIVE (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/tucson-electric-power-proposesnew-utility-owned-rooftop-solar-program/299840/ (describing Tucson Electric Power’s proposal and
quoting one solar energy industry advocate as accusing the utility of “trying to go into a completely new
market and compete on an unlevel playing field in a market that’s already served by competitive forces”).
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allowing electric utilities to enter into established, competitive markets are unprecedented
and raise significant policy concerns. The impropriety of welcoming utilities into the
rooftop solar energy market is most easily illuminated through the basic microeconomics
framework that has long served as the primary theoretical basis for utility regulation itself.
A. Natural Monopoly Theory
The basic characteristics of electricity distribution make it inherently prone to a
condition that economists describe as the “natural monopoly” problem. 84 A natural
monopoly is a firm that can produce all of the output demanded in its relevant market for
a lower aggregate cost than is achievable by a group of smaller, competitive firms. This
capability clearly exists for utilities in retail electricity distribution markets. The large upfront expenditures associated with building out an extensive infrastructure system capable
of distributing electric power to customers throughout a region make it very difficult for
firms to enter such markets and effectively compete with incumbent utilities. In the
absence of government intervention, such utilities would thus be largely free to act like
monopolies, charging excessively high prices and raking in large profits without serious
risk of a loss of market share.
In recognition of this market failure, a heavy regulatory structure has long sought
to prevent inefficient behavior by natural monopolies within the electricity distribution
industry. Such regulations generally prohibit utilities from charging excessive prices and
ensure that utilities provide service to all qualified customers within their service areas.
In exchange for these obligations, state regulators protect utilities from certain types of
competition and allow them to earn a reasonable return on their infrastructure
investments. Although it is far from perfect, this regulatory approach has been fairly
effective at promoting reliable, low-cost electric power distribution for a very long time.
B. Rooftop Solar Markets are Not Prone to Natural Monopoly Problems
Unfortunately, the current utility regulatory system is poorly suited for use in
competitive markets such as the market for rooftop solar energy installations. Unlike
markets for grid-supplied electricity, the market for rooftop solar energy installations is
not prone to the natural monopoly problem. Entering the rooftop solar market as a
producer does not require exceptionally large up-front investments. Low barriers to entry
allow multiple retail solar panel sellers and installers to efficiently compete on price,
quality and service. Likewise, it is not a waste of resources for multiple smaller,
competing rooftop solar businesses to co-exist in the same geographic area. Accordingly,
healthy market competition already exists in the rooftop solar industry, helping to
promote continued innovation, quality products, and reasonable profit margins. Like the
existing markets for rooftop shingles or rooftop gutters, the market for rooftop solar PV
can function very efficiently without the sort of heavy government intervention that
electricity distribution markets require.

84. For a primer on natural monopolies and the predominant approach to regulating them, see
generally FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 53–65 (Foundation Press
3d ed. 2010).
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These fundamental differences between electricity distribution markets and the
rooftop solar markets greatly affect how policymakers should approach project proposals
like those of APS and TEP described above.85 Since rooftop solar markets are not prone
to natural monopoly problems, utilities operating within regulatory regimes designed to
address natural monopoly problems have no place in these markets. Allowing elements
of a heavy regulatory structure designed to govern natural monopolies to creep into such
private competitive markets is akin to administering a powerful prescription drug to a
patient who is not sick: no real benefits are likely to result, yet it has the potential to cause
costly and harmful side effects.
To permit regulated utilities to compete as producers in rooftop solar markets
through projects like those proposed by APS and TEP would essentially stack the deck
in such utilities’ favor. Regulated utilities often have access to lower-cost capital, large
customer bases, and market risk protections that simply are not available to non-utility
rooftop solar installation firms. Lacking equivalent advantages, many companies are
likely to pull out of rooftop solar markets where utilities are permitted to directly compete.
As they do, an industry that once thrived under healthy competition will gradually
degenerate into one unnecessarily burdened with inefficiencies and stifled innovation.
C. Avoiding an “Unnatural Monopoly” Problem in the Rooftop Solar Industry
The present struggle between electric utilities and the rooftop solar energy industry
is not the first time that a regulated utility has sought to protect its monopoly against
disruptive innovation. Some have used the term “unnatural monopoly” to describe such
instances when a regulated utility is permitted to enter an industry that is not prone to
natural monopoly problems.86 Policies that perpetuate such unnatural monopoly problems
tend to be highly inefficient and are rarely cost-justified.87
For example, an analogous sort of unnatural monopoly problem existed toward the
end of AT&T’s control of telecommunication markets in the 1980s and 90s.
Understandably, AT&T would have liked to respond to technological advancements that
were transforming the landline telephone industry through new ventures enabled the
company to compete directly in the emerging markets that threatened its monopoly
position.88 However, Congress and regulators eventually erected various barriers between
AT&T and those emerging technology markets to help prevent AT&T from abusing its
incumbent utility status to gain an anticompetitive advantage in those new industries.89
A similar sort of policy response is needed today in the context of rooftop solar
energy. Policymakers would never permit a regulated electric utility to begin selling
85. See generally supra text accompanying nn. 84–86.
86. See generally Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development
of
the
Bell
System
Monopoly,
14
CATO
J.
267
(1994),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1994/11/cj14n2-6.pdf.
87. See id. at 267 (noting that utility regulation in the telecommunications industry in the 1990s
was “impeding the growth of new technologies, jobs, and exports, while simultaneously denying consumers
the benefits of competition.”).
88. See Jordan Jay Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The Martyrdom of the Regulated
Monopolist, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1224 (1984) (stating that “AT&T would undoubtedly have preferred
to enter” emerging, unregulated markets for computer-based data processing “free from any structural
constraints”).
89. See id. at 1224–29 (describing numerous constraints on AT&T’s ability to compete directly
in emerging technology markets that threatened its monopoly on telecommunication services).
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rooftop shingles or rooftop gutters in the private marketplace. For similar reasons, entities
that enjoy the advantages of being regulated electric utilities should not be permitted to
compete directly in the market for rooftop solar installations. Electric utilities and their
subsidiaries should be required to forfeit all regulatory protections and become fully
privatized before competing as producers in these markets. This principle should apply
even to subtle forms of market entry like those exemplified by the recent APS and TEP
project proposals. Policies that consciously guard against unnatural monopoly problems
through these and other means will promote greater economic efficiency as innovation
continues to transform electricity markets in the coming years.
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VI. THE RISKS OF OPTING OUT OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR
WESTERN STATES
MELISSA POWERS******
A. Introduction
In June 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its proposed
Clean Power Plan, a Clean Air Act regulation that would require existing fossil fuel-fired
power plants to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.90 Opposition to the proposal was
swift. Companies in the coal industry and several states preemptively challenged the
Clean Power Plan in court, arguing that EPA lacks statutory authority to regulate the
emissions from existing power plants.91 Opponents to the Clean Power Plan also argued
in court, before Congress, and in the press that the plan was unconstitutional. 92 Many
states and regulated parties likewise asserted that the plan would be unworkable and
unduly expensive. Finally, in March 2014, in an asserted attempt to fight back against the
Obama Administration’s purported “war on coal,” Senator Mitch McConnell began to
urge states to “just say no” to the Clean Power Plan by refusing to adopt state strategies
to implement the plan’s emissions limits.93
The “just say no” campaign immediately attracted significant media attention and
opposition from EPA and the Clean Power Plan’s supporters.94 These responses
undoubtedly fulfilled some of Senator McConnell’s goals to drive further wedges
between advocates and opponents of the Clean Power Plan. However, setting politics
aside, it would be shortsighted and counter-productive for western states to heed Senator
McConnell’s advice. As this essay will explain, western states that pursue an “opt-out”
strategy will surrender significant decision-making authority to the EPA as a result of the
cooperative-federalism structure of the Clean Air Act. Although these states could
ultimately regain the power to administer the Clean Power Plan, they would nonetheless
lose the ability to establish a guiding structure for the Clean Power Plan’s implementation
in the West. By the time states step in to take over the Clean Power Plan from EPA, it
could be too late for them to reverse the course set by other states interested in creating a
regional framework for implementing the Plan. Thus, rather than opt out, this essay

******

Associate Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.

90. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 FED. REG. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean
Power Plan].
91. See West Virginia v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (In re Murray Energy Corp.), 788 F.3d 330,
333 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
92. See Coral Davenport, McConnell Urges States to Help Thwart Obama’s “War on Coal”, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/us/politics/mitch-mcconnell-urges-states-tohelp-thwart-obamas-war-on-coal.html?_r=0.
93. Mitch McConnell, Op-Ed, States Should Reject Obama Mandate for Clean-Power
Regulations,
LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER,
Mar.
3,
2015,
http://www.kentucky.com/2015/03/03/3725288_states-should-reject-obama-mandate.html?rh=1.
94. Davenport, supra note 92; Greg Sargent, Mitch McConnell Has a Plan to Derail Obama’s
Climate
Agenda.
It
Might
Actually
Work.,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
23,
2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/03/23/mitch-mcconnell-has-a-plan-to-derailobamas-climate-agenda-it-might-actually-work/; Mitch McConnell: An Example of When “Just Say No”
Goes Wrong, SIERRA CLUB COMPASS, Mar. 16, 2015, http://www.sierraclub.org/compass/2015/03/mitchmcconnell-example-when-just-say-no-goes-wrong.
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argues that western states—even those opposed to the Plan—should start planning their
implementation strategies.
Part B of the essay briefly introduces the Clean Power Plan and the structure the
Clean Air Act establishes for implementing existing source emissions standards. Part C
discusses the underlying objective of Senator McConnell’s opt-out advice and how that
would affect states that pursued an opt-out strategy. Part D then argues that western states
should eschew the opt-out approach, even if they otherwise object to the Clean Power
Plan.
B. The Clean Power Plan in a Nutshell
The Clean Power Plan is a proposed regulation under Clean Air Act section 111(d)
that would require existing fossil fuel-fired power plants to reduce their emissions of
carbon dioxide. Section 111(d) generally gives states the primary responsibility for
regulating existing source emissions, subject to EPA-established requirements.95 Section
111(d) regulates a narrow set of pollutants, 96 however, and it has been rarely used to date.
EPA’s proposal for applying section 111(d) to carbon dioxide emissions from power
plants is undoubtedly ambitious.
Pollutants regulated under section 111(d) are subject to “standards of
performance.”97 A standard of performance is
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and
any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements)
the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated. 98
Traditionally, EPA has treated standards of performance as technology-based emissions
limitations achievable by the affected sources.
With the proposed Clean Power Plan, however, EPA focused on the phrase “best
system of emission reduction” to propose emissions limitations based on what the
electricity system could achieve as a whole.99 Under this system-wide approach, EPA
proposed emissions limitations that could be achieved through the use of four building
blocks: 1) efficiency gains at each affected power plant, 2) reduced use of high-emitting
affected power plants in favor of increase use of lower-emitting affected power plants, 3)
reduced generation at all affected power plants in favor of low- and zero-carbon sources
(i.e., renewable and nuclear power plants), and 4) reduced generation at all affected power
plants through energy efficiency. 100 In other words, rather than consider how technology
applied only to regulated facilities might lower emissions, EPA considered how
improvements to each state’s electricity system might enable reduced emissions at each

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012).
Id. The scope of this regulatory power is at issue in the Murray Energy lawsuit, supra note
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012).
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
Clean Power Plan, supra note 90, at 34,834–35.
Id. at 34,836.
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affected source. EPA then created state-specific emissions rates (what EPA calls statespecific goals) that states would implement.101
States have the primary responsibility for implementing section 111(d).
Specifically, section 111(d) directs EPA to “establish a procedure” under which states
shall submit to the EPA a plan establishing standards of performance for regulated
existing source emissions and requirements for the implementation and enforcement of
the standards of performance.102 If a state fails to submit a satisfactory plan, EPA may
promulgate a federal plan instead.103
In the draft Clean Power Plan, EPA likewise proposed that states would play the
primary role in implementing the standards of performance for the affected power plants.
Under EPA’s proposed rules, states could therefore decide whether to apply the statespecific goals to the affected sources or whether to develop an alternative compliance
strategy.104For example, states might adopt a cap-and-trade program to reduce statewide
carbon dioxide emissions.105 Or states might aim to displace carbon dioxide emissions by
increasing renewable power generation.106 Ultimately, under the proposed Clean Power
Plan, states would have broad discretion so long as they adopt their own plan. If, however,
a state opts out of the planning process, EPA would decide how to implement the statespecific goals.
C. The “Just Say No” Strategy
EPA’s draft rule prompted an early—and likely premature—rush to the courthouse,
first by fossil fuel producers and then by several Republican states. Their suits raise a
host of legal and constitutional arguments. The constitutional arguments have earned
quite a bit of media attention, largely because Laurence Tribe—who is generally
considered a liberal constitutional scholar—has made them.107 Seemingly emboldened by
these legal arguments108 (but also perhaps fearful that the D.C. Circuit would dismiss the
suits as unripe), Senator McConnell jumped into the fray with his “just say no” campaign.
In an op-ed109 and a letter sent to the National Governors Association,110 Senator
McConnell urged state political leaders to refuse to adopt their own SIPs to implement
the Clean Power Plan.
Senator McConnell appears to be motivated by a number of factors. First, he
expressly stated that he hopes the opt-out strategy would serve as a stalling tactic,
enabling the Clean Power Plan to languish while future legal challenges and repeal efforts
ensue.111 Underlying this hope must be his fear that the Plan will gather momentum and
support as states work to implement it while legal challenges proceed. Second, Senator
101. Id. at 34,895.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2).
104. Clean Power Plan, supra note 90, at 34,833, 34,837–39.
105. Id. at 34,837–39.
106. Id. at 34,838–39. Alternative strategies, like one based on renewable power generation, would
still have to meet the required emissions reductions.
107. Davenport, supra note 92.
108. Id.
109. McConnell, supra note 93.
110. Letter from Sen. Mitch McConnell to Nat’l Governors Ass’n (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/McConnelltoGovernors.pdf [hereinafter
McConnell letter].
111. Id. at 3.
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McConnell may be trying to upset the international negotiations to create the next climate
change treaty.112 If enough states opt out of the Clean Power Plan, this may send a
message to the rest of the world that the United States is not serious about reducing its
own greenhouse gas emissions. Third, the opt-out strategy could help perpetuate the
partisan political divide that has enabled the Republican Party to regain control of
Congress and attract massive political donations. If states refuse to develop their own
plans, and EPA develops plans in their place, this would feed into Republican attempts
to portray the President as an out-of-control dictator.113 Whatever his motivations,
Senator McConnell’s opt-out proposal has both garnered praise and incited outrage.
D. Opting Out is Not in Western States’ Best Interests
While some states may find the opt-out strategy politically appealing, they should
reject Senator McConnell’s “just say no” advice. States that opt out will miss the
opportunity to influence any regional plans that western states may develop under the
Clean Power Plan framework. While states would have the opportunity to develop an SIP
and take over the planning and implementation process at a later time, it could be too late
for those states to meaningfully affect policy. Moreover, opting out is an impractical
strategy for western states with utilities that operate in multiple jurisdictions. Finally,
opting out could undermine states’ nascent renewable energy industries at the very
moment when renewable power production could become more lucrative.
States that “opt out” will miss out on opportunities to influence regional plans.
Although it is possible that states in the West could pursue a go-it-alone strategy, most
observers think that the history of electricity coordination between western states makes
it more likely that states would enter into regional plans.114 States that sit on the sidelines
could lose influence in the planning process. For example, some observers believe that
Washington, Oregon, and California could enter into a regional implementation
agreement that would flow from the states’ agreement to cooperate to address climate
change and boost renewable energy. 115 The states could potentially attempt to extend
California’s emissions trading program for greenhouse gases up the Pacific Coast
(although that would likely require enacting legislation in Oregon and Washington) or
they might instead design a renewable energy credit trading scheme to facilitate
renewable power development. Under either context, other states could experience
knock-on effects they could not directly control. For example, a regional agreement
between the Pacific Coast states could influence the planning decisions of the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council (NWPCC), of which Idaho and Montana are members,
along with Oregon and Washington. The NWPCC develops five-year plans for energy
use and conservation based on a number of assumptions, including economic conditions,
regulatory requirements, price forecasts, population growth, and other factors that
112. Davenport, supra note 92.
113. See generally McConnell letter, supra note 110.
114. See Angus Duncan, Clean Air Act Section 111(d) CO2 Reduction Compliance Pathways for
the Pacific Northwest and Intermountain West States, 30 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 303, 319 (2015).
115. See Ryan Koronowski, California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia Agree to
Cooperate
on
Reducing
Carbon
Pollution,
THNNK PROGRESS,
Oct.
28,
2013,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/10/28/2850021/california-oregon-washington-british-columbiaagreement/.
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contribute to energy consumption.116 If Oregon and Washington join a regional
implementation plan but Montana and Idaho do not, NWPCC would still have to consider
how Oregon and Washington’s plan would affect the Northwest’s energy mix. Thus,
sitting the planning process out would not insulate states from the practical effects of a
regional plan.
It is true that states could take back their implementation authority from EPA if
they were to develop SIPs and receive EPA’s approval at some later point. By that time,
however, the state would either have to comply individually or join an existing regional
plan (or try to create a separate regional agreement, which is unlikely). If a state that had
opted out later sought to join a regional agreement, it could find itself at a disadvantage.
The details of an emissions trading program could make compliance easier for some
states and more challenging for others. As the old adage goes, “if you’re not at the table,
you’re on the menu.” Electricity regulators in Ohio made a similar point recently to their
own political leaders, noting that an opt-out strategy could unduly tie the state’s hands
and expose their ratepayers to higher compliance costs.117
Opting out is also impractical and risky for utilities that operate in multiple states.
PacifiCorp, which has subsidiaries that operate in California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho,
Utah, and Wyoming, faces particular risk.118 Its coal-fired power plants in Utah and
Wyoming currently provide a substantial amount of power to the other states. If some of
these other states adopt implementation plans that go beyond EPA’s proposed guidelines,
their reliance on imported coal-based power could drop below expectations. If demand
drops substantially, PacifiCorp could find the plants uneconomical to operate, and it could
seek rate increases in the states that opted out to compensate for lower demand. While a
regional plan could produce these effects as well, utilities and states would at least be
able to plan strategically for the anticipated reductions on coal-fired power production.
Sitting the planning process out would undermine any strategic efforts.
Finally, states that opt out may miss out on renewable power development
opportunities. For example, a Pacific Coast regional renewable energy plan could
promote the formation of new long-term contracts and development of new transmission
lines to facilitate power deliveries from eastern Washington and Oregon (which have a
lot of wind and solar power) to energy-hungry California. Other western states with wind
and solar resources might find it more difficult to access California’s renewable energy
market. Insufficient transmission capacity has already been a hurdle in states like
Montana, and a failure to plan at the regional level for renewable power growth could
place states like Montana at a further disadvantage.
In sum, while the opt-out idea may sound politically appealing to state leaders who
believe the Clean Power Plan is illegal and unwise, the risks of opting out are too great,
particularly in the West. States who oppose the Clean Power Plan would be better off
following the approach Ohio regulators have advocated: let the political leaders pursue
their legal challenges in court, but let the regulators continue planning, just in case. And

116. See, e.g., Sixth Northwest Conservation & Electric Power Plan, NW. POWER &
CONSERVATION COUNCIL (2010), https://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/6/plan/.
117. Rod Kuckro, Ohio Regulators Tell Lawmakers to Butt Out on EPA’s Clean Power Plan,
ENERGYWIRE, Mar. 27, 2015, http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060015862/search?keyword
=Regulators+Tell+Lawmakers+to+Butt+Out+on+EPA’s+Clean+Power+Plan.
118. About Us, Company Overview, PACIFICORP, http://www.pacificorp.com/about/co.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2015).
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who knows? Maybe the regulators will decide that the Clean Power Plan offers
opportunities, not just obligations.
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VII. RENEWABLE ENERGY ON PUBLIC LANDS: HOW U.S. POLICY FAILS TO
PROMOTE RENEWABLES
NICK LAWTON*******
The United States and the Obama administration purport to promote renewable
energy on federal public lands.119 However, policies in place and in progress fail to create
a regulatory environment that promotes renewables nearly as effectively as fossil fuels.
Consequently, U.S. energy production from public lands will likely continue to skew
toward fossil fuels.
The United States owns roughly 640 million acres of public lands, with most
situated in 11 western states.120 Indeed, the United States owns roughly half of all lands
in the West, most of which falls under control of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
and the United States Forest Service (USFS). 121 In contrast, the United States owns
roughly 4% of the land in Eastern states.122 Thus, public lands management is mostly a
western issue.
Because public lands include some areas with excellent access to sun and wind,
land management policy is critical to western energy development. The Wilderness
Society has estimated that U.S. public lands have the technical potential to generate 2,900
gigawatts of solar power in the Southwest and 206 gigawatts of wind power throughout
the West.123 In comparison, the United States needed 966 GW of generating capacity in
2013 to ensure stable power supplies.124 Thus, U.S. public lands have the potential to
generate far more renewable energy than the nation actually requires.125
Because the United States governs public lands with complex regulations, western
states face unique challenges for renewable energy development. Nevertheless, western
states have overwhelmingly adopted policies requiring renewable energy to satisfy
significant shares of state energy use. 126 And these goals will likely grow more rigorous.

*******

Staff Attorney, Green Energy Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School.

119. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 931, 119 Stat. 594, 868 (2005)
(setting forth renewable energy development objectives); The President’s Climate Action Plan of June 2013,
EXEC.
OFFICE
OF
THE
PRESIDENT
(2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27aclimateactionplan.pdf
(noting
that
“President Obama has set a goal to double renewable electricity generation once again by 2020”).
120. Cong. Research Serv., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data 1 (2012),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Renewable Resource Potential on Public Lands, WILDERNESS SOC’Y (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/legacy/WebsiteRenewable%20Resource%20Potential%20On%20Public%20Lands.pdf.
124. How Much Electric Supply Capacity is Needed to Keep U.S. Electricity Grids Reliable?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9671.
125. Of course, to satisfy U.S. energy demand reliably, adequate energy storage and transmission
assets would be necessary, and those indispensible elements for a renewably powered grid do not yet exist.
126. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES
&
EFFICIENCY,
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/RenewablePortfolio-Standards-with-Solar-and-DG-Provisions.pptx (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (showing that most
western states have enacted a Renewable Portfolio Standard).
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The falling price of renewable energy makes it increasingly desirable, 127 and the federal
Clean Power Plan may drive renewable energy development.128 California has already
proposed requiring 50% renewable energy by 2050.129 Reaching expanded renewable
energy development goals—and the ultimate goal of a carbon-free electricity system—
will likely require renewable energy from public lands. Both because BLM administers
many public lands, and because BLM lands are generally well suited for renewables, most
development will likely occur on BLM lands.
Title V of the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) governs
renewable energy development on BLM Lands.130 Under BLM’s current regulations,
developers must obtain “rights of way,” 131 which generally are not competitive. BLM
issues rights of way for renewables on a first-come, first-served basis, managing
competitive leasing only when two developers apply for rights to the same parcel.132 To
obtain a right of way, a developer must submit a development plan, conduct
environmental impact analyses, and pay fair market value to the U.S. Treasury. 133 Neither
BLM nor states receive revenue directly from rights of way.134
Additionally, BLM has begun integrating renewable energy planning into
comprehensive Resource Management Plans (RMPs).135 In this process, BLM identifies
lands best suited for renewables and closes other parcels due to conflicts with wildlife or
other land uses. Proposed RMPs in which BLM has done this suggest that the agency will
likely close many lands to renewables.136 Because the RMP process requires significant
environmental analysis, to which later development can refer, this process will in theory
save later developers time and money.
Federal mandates require BLM to permit some renewable energy development. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires BLM to approve at least 10,000 megawatts (MW) of

127. E.g., Silvio Marcacci, Analysis: 50% Reduction in Cost of Renewable Energy Since 2008,
CLEANTECHNICA (Sept. 11, 2013), http://cleantechnica.com/2013/09/11/analysis-50-reduction-in-cost-ofrenewable-energy-since-2008/.
128. E.g., Renewable Generation in the Clean Power Plan, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/epa/carbon-pollution-standards-renewable-energy-map
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (depicting current renewable energy development and necessary development to
meet Clean Power Plan targets).
129. Nick Lawton, California Governor Jerry Brown Proposes Significant RPS Expansion,
CHARGED DEBATE (Jan. 6, 2015), http://greenenergyinstitute.blogspot.com/2015/01/california-governorjerry-brown.html.
130. Cong. Research Serv., Energy Projects on Federal Lands: Leasing and Authorization 16
(2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40806.pdf.
131. Id. at 17.
132. 43 C.F.R. § 2804.23 (2015).
133. Id. at § 2804.12.
134. Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind
Energy Development and Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed. Reg. 59,022-01, 59,027 (proposed
Sept. 30, 2014) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2800, 2880).
135. E.g., BARBARA SHARROW, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. ,UNCOMPAHGRE FIELD OFFICE RMP
PLANNING
FACT
SHEET:
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
RESOURCES,
(
2010),
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/co/field_offices/uncompahgre_field/documents.Par.38352.File.dat/
UFO%20RMP%20Fact%20Sheet%207.3%20Renewable%20Energy.pdf.
136. See Henry Brean, BLM Plan Would Tag More of Southern Nevada for Protection, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/blm-plan-would-tag-moresouthern-nevada-protection (noting that the proposed RMP for the Las Vegas region would close more than
10 times as much land as it would designate as appropriate for solar development).
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renewables on public lands by 2015,137 while President Obama’s Climate Action Plan
requires approval of at least 20,000 MW by 2020.138 Since 2010, BLM has approved 33
solar projects with capacity of over 8,000 MW, 39 wind projects with capacity of 5,557
MW, and 59 geothermal facilities with capacity of 1,500 MW. 139 Thus, BLM is making
progress toward federal goals.
However, in other regards renewable energy development on public lands appears
laggardly. The Los Angeles Times reports that in California, BLM has approved only 18
of 375 applications for renewable energy rights of way since 2007.140 The American Wind
Energy Association reports that through 2012, only 1.4% of wind energy was sited on
public lands.141 The Solar Energy Industries Association reports that public lands host
only 23% of operational utility-scale solar facilities and only 36% of facilities under
construction.142 And the National Wildlife Federation criticizes current regulations as
“outdated and inefficient,” inadequate to assess wildlife impacts, and prone to increase
“costs and risk to investors.”143 Thus, public lands still pose a daunting challenge for
renewable energy.
Both BLM and Congress have proposed reforms that would ostensibly promote
renewable energy on public lands. BLM is currently considering comments on a new
competitive leasing rule.144 Meanwhile, the 113th Congress considered, but failed to pass,
a similar bill that would also have shared revenues. 145 However, neither measure will
significantly alter the regulatory landscape for renewable energy on public lands.
Under BLM’s proposed rule, competitive leasing would become the default for
renewable energy.146 The proposed rule aims to channel development to “designated
leasing areas” (DLAs) by offering more favorable lease terms for projects located therein,
including lower rents and fees.147 All projects would owe acreage-based rent and a fee
based on electricity generating capacity. 148 Revenues would remain with the U.S.
treasury.149

137. Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 119, at § 211, 660.
138. Secretary Jewell Underscores Importance of Landscape-Level Approach, Mitigation in
Meeting President’s Renewable Energy Goals on Public Lands, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (Aug. 13,
2013), http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2013/august/NR_08_13_2013.html.
139. New Energy for America, US DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. (last updated
July 1, 2015), http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/renewable_energy.html.
140. Julie Cart, Gov. Brown’s Renewable Energy Plan Could Boost Solar, Wind Industries, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-renewable-goals-20150108-story.html.
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AM.
WIND
ENERGY
ASS’N,
http://www.awea.org/Issues/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=858 (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
142. Hearing on Breaking the Logjam at BLM: Examining Ways to More Efficiently Process
Permits for Energy Production on Federal Lands Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 113th Cong.
6 (2014) (testimony of Arthur Haubenstauck, Chair of Utility Scale Solar Power Division, Solar Energy
Industries Association), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve? File_id=da4d37eb9f3b-4eae-8c11-7f9c6b0c6f92.
143. , NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, PUBLIC LANDS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
2013
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SHEET
1
(2013),
http://www.nwf.org/pdf/PolicySolutions/NWF_PLRED2013_Factsheet_final.pdf.
144. Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind
Energy Development and Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed. Reg. at 59,022.
145. Public Lands Renewable Energy Devolopment Act of 2013, H.R. 596, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
146. Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind
Energy Development and Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed. Reg. at 59,022–23.
147. Id. at 59,023.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 59,027.
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BLM’s proposed rule would help avoid wildlife and land use conflicts by
channeling development to DLAs, but would not otherwise make development easier. In
fact, the proposed rule has several weaknesses. BLM recognizes that capacity factors for
renewables vary geographically, but the rule would use only one national average, 150
fixing an inappropriately high fee for less sunny or windy climes. Similarly, the rule
would charge inflexible fixed fees to variable generators, 151 which would produce
hardship in less sunny or windy times. Additionally, the rule inflates capacity fees
through reliance on high, outdated wholesale power prices.152 The greatest defect, though,
is delayed gratification. Designating DLAs in RMPs will take years: one proposed RMP
in Colorado took 8 years to develop.153 Consequently, the rule’s main incentives will take
effect slowly and variably, risking geographical inequity. More fundamentally, the rule
focuses more on getting more money out of renewable energy, rather than lowering its
costs or easing its access to lands, suggesting that it would not really promote more
renewable energy.
The 113th Congress, meanwhile, considered a more helpful bill, but failed to pass
it.154 That bill would also have promoted competitive leasing, but its most interesting
feature was royalty sharing. Under the bill, the U.S. Treasury would have received only
10% of revenues, the land-management agency (usually BLM) would have received 15%,
and states and counties would have received 25% each. The remaining 25% would have
gone to a conservation fund to restore lands or wildlife damaged by renewable energy
development. However, despite broad support from states, counties, and
environmentalists, the 113th Congress failed to pass this bill. The odds of a similar bill
passing the 114th Congress seem negligible.
Thus, neither the current system nor proposed reforms will likely change the
regulatory landscape for renewables on public lands. Policies favoring fossil fuels will
likely persist. Current approval rates for renewable energy rights of way versus fossil fuel
leases suggest the latter are far easier to obtain. The L.A. Times reports that BLM has
approved only 18 of 375 renewable energy rights of way in California since 2007. 155 In
contrast, Greenwire reports that many companies are stockpiling thousands of unused oil
and gas extraction permits.156 In sum, the federal government’s sound and fury about
promoting renewable energy on public lands seem to signify nothing.

150. Id. at 59,044–45.
151. Id. at 59,023.
152. Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind
Energy Development and Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed. Reg.at 59,045.
153. KFO & CRVFO RMP Revision General Schedule, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF
LAND
MGMT.,
http://www.blm.gov/co/st/en/BLM_Programs/land_use_planning/rmp/kfogsfo/general_schedule.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2014) (showing that RMP revision began in 2006 and ended
in 2014).
154. Public Lands Renewable Energy Development Act of 2013, H.R. 596, 113th Cong. (2013).
155. Cart, supra note 140.
156. Phil Taylor, Energy Companies Stockpiling Drilling Permits Across West, GREENWIRE (Oct.
23, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060007795.
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VIII. UTILITY REFORM IN HAWAII AND NEW YORK: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE NORTHWEST
NATE LARSEN********
The American energy sector is rapidly evolving. Renewables are approaching
economic parity with fossil resources,157 and President Obama has demonstrated a
newfound resolve to act to combat climate change. 158 Recognizing the disruptive potential
of this evolution, state regulators are beginning to develop reforms to encourage the
transition toward a cleaner, smarter, and more resilient electricity system.
Hawaii and New York were among the first states to pursue these reforms in a
comprehensive manner. Within a period of four days between April 24 and April 28,
2014, both states issued sweeping proposals to modernize their electric industries. This
article examines these proposed reforms and evaluates the impacts these policies may
have on the electric industry in the Northwest.
A. Background
Despite the similarities of Hawaii’s and New York’s proposals, the circumstances
that motivated these states to implement reforms differ considerably.
The Hawaiian electricity system is unique in the United States; it is not
interconnected with the mainland, it is fueled primarily by imported petroleum, and it
boasts the most customer-sited solar generation in the country. Due to these factors,
Hawaii has the highest retail electric rates in the nation. As a result, Hawaiians have
embraced the state’s net metering program, installing rooftop solar on as many as 11% of
households on some islands. Additionally, the state boasts the highest Renewable
Portfolio Standard (RPS) in the country—40% renewable energy by 2030—with an
additional 30% load reduction from energy efficiency. Facing high energy costs,
aggressive RPS requirements, and the impending economic parity of some renewable
resources with fossil fuel resources, Hawaii’s PUC recognized the need to reform its
regulatory regime to reflect the state’s energy realities and ambitions.
On April 28, 2014, the Hawaii PUC directed the state’s investor-owned utilities,
which collectively comprise the HECO Companies (HECO) to file plans in accordance
with the state’s policy objectives. To guide HECO in drafting those plans, the PUC
concurrently issued its Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s Electric
Utilities (Commission’s Inclinations) white paper.159 HECO subsequently filed its
required plans on August 26, 2014.160

********

Energy Fellow, Green Energy Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School.

157. Diane Cardwell, Solar and Wind Energy Start to Win on Price vs. Conventional Fuels, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/business/energy-environment/solar-and-windenergy-start-to-win-on-price-vs-conventional-fuels.html?_r=0.
158. See, e.g., Clean Power Plan, supra note 90.
159. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 314 P.U.R. 4th 49 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n April 28, 2014) [hereinafter
Commission’s Inclinations] (referencing Exhibit A).
160. As of March 1, 2015, these plans are still awaiting PUC approval. On December 3, 2014,
NextEra Energy announced that it had agreed to purchase HECO for $4.3 billion, contingent upon approvals
from state and federal regulators. That sale will not impact HECO’s filed plans.
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The motivating circumstances that culminated in Hawaii’s reforms differ from the
circumstances in New York. New York deregulated its electric industry in 1996, which
means that Independent Power Producers own most of the state’s generation facilities and
customers can purchase power from over 50 non-utility energy suppliers. Nevertheless,
New York has the fifth highest electricity rates in the U.S. 161 In addition, the impacts of
Hurricane Sandy highlighted the importance of grid resilience in the state.
On April 24, 2014, in response to directives from the New York Public Service
Commission (PSC), the New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) released a
staff report and proposal, entitled Reforming the Energy Vision (REV), which proposed
an array of sweeping reforms to the state’s electric industry. 162 The following day, the
PSC issued an order initiating a two-track proceeding to consider and recommend specific
regulatory actions to address the issues raised in the REV. 163
B. Reforms
The utility reform proposals that Hawaii and New York each put forward include a
number of policy similarities, despite the divergent circumstances that led the states to
initiate reforms. These common elements include the modernization of the distribution
system, customer engagement and the development of a market structure to support a
modern distribution system, and changes to the regulatory regime to reflect those new
realities.
1. Distribution System Managers
In both Hawaii’s Commission’s Inclinations and New York’s REV proposals,
regulators anticipate a transition away from the traditional utility model of electricity
generation and delivery towards a more dynamic and flexible system of integrated
distributed energy resources (DER), including customer-sited generation, demand
response, and energy efficiency. Utility roles will thus need to shift from electricity
generators and providers to distribution system managers that facilitate DER
development while ensuring system reliability.
In its Commission’s Inclinations guidance document, the Hawaii PUC highlighted
the need for HECO to develop a distribution system that can both deliver power to
customers and accept power from distributed resources.164 To address that need, the PUC
ordered HECO to file a plan to modernize the distribution grid.
In its REV straw proposal and report, the New York DPS proposed to create
entities—Distributed System Platform Providers (DSPPs)—specifically responsible for
managing the distribution grid. The New York DPS envisions that DSPPs will play three
primary roles in the future of New York’s electricity system: 1) operating and maintaining
161. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Rankings: Average Retail Price of Electricity to Residential Sector,
June 2015 (cents/kWh), EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/state/rankings/?sid=NY#series/31 (last visited Nov. 30,
2015).
162. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., Case 14-M-0101, Reforming the Energy Vision, NYS Department
of Public Service Staff Report and Proposal (2014) [hereinafter REV].
163. Reforming the Energy Vision, Case 14-M-0101, 2014 WL 1713082, at *6 (N.Y.P.S.C. April
25, 2014) (proc. on motion).
164. Commission’s Inclinations, supra note 159.
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the distribution grid; 2) managing markets and tariffs to monetize DER integration; and
3) serving as an intermediary between retail customers and the transmission grid. The
REV identifies incumbent distribution utilities as the optimal entities to fill that role.165
2. Customer Engagement
In both the Commission’s Inclinations and the REV proposals, customer
engagement is deemed important to distribution system operations. Although both states’
reforms represent significant departures from the traditional electricity consumer model,
customers may still choose to receive bundled electricity service under the proposed
reforms.
In Hawaii, where renewable energy is approaching economic parity with traditional
resources, the PUC directed HECO to consider upgrading the distribution system to
accommodate distributed generation and demand response. Likewise, New York
regulators envision widespread participation in an active distribution market, where DER
consumers can sell products and services from their systems.
3. Regulatory Reforms
Regulators in both Hawaii and New York proposed rate design and ratemaking
reforms to facilitate the modernization of their distribution systems. These rate design
reforms attempt to address cost allocation issues and allow customers to select electricity
products and services based on their individual needs. The states’ proposed ratemaking
reforms decouple volumetric electricity sales from utility profits, and instead connect
profits with desirable policy outcomes. Rather than discussing both states’ rate design
and ratemaking reform proposals, the following sections consider Hawaii’s proposed rate
design reforms and the changes that DPS staff proposed to New York’s ratemaking
regime.
C. Hawaii’s Rate Design Reforms
The Hawaii PUC proposed a number of options for reforming HECO’s rate design
to address perceived cost allocation issues associated with Hawaii’s high levels of
distributed generation. These options include: 1) implementing an unbundled retail
electricity rate structure, 2) transitioning to capacity-based, fixed-cost based pricing, and
3) adopting a supplemental power supply pricing structure. The mechanics of these
options vary, but each would charge DG customers for the grid-related services they
consume.
In response, HECO proposed eliminating Hawaii’s Net Energy Metering (NEM)
program and allocating distribution-related costs among DG customers via fixed
charges.166 HECO asserted that the NEM program creates cost-allocation inequities,
because NEM customers do not pay their share of the costs associated with safely and
reliably delivering electricity.167 In place of the NEM program, HECO proposed to
compensate DG customers through a tariff rate indexed to a market-based proxy, such as
a renewable energy power purchase agreements.168 In addition to effectively decreasing
165.
166.
167.
168.

REV, supra note 162, at 25.
Commission’s Inclinations, supra note 159, at 6–7.
Id. at 6–10.
Id. at 6–15.
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their compensation, HECO proposed to subject DG customers to fixed interconnection
and grid services charges.169 These reforms would significantly diminish the value of
consumer-owned DG resources.
D. New York’s Ratemaking Reforms
New York’s DPS staff proposed a variety of modifications to New York’s
ratemaking model, including implementing 1) long-term rate plans, 2) outcome (or
results-based) ratemaking, 3) symmetrical incentives, and 4) revenue decoupling
mechanisms.
First, the REV proposed to extend the rate plan period up to eight years, a move
which would provide added certainty, reduce expenses related to contested rate cases,
and encourage utilities to reduce expenses to achieve higher profits. Second, the REV
proposed outcome or results-based ratemaking. Rather than incentivizing capitalintensive investments, outcome-based ratemaking would reward utilities for achieving
customer value and desirable policy objectives. Third, the REV proposed symmetrical
incentives, which would retain negative incentives and include positive incentives for
utilities that provide high-quality service or otherwise achieve policy goals. Fourth, the
REV proposed revenue decoupling mechanisms, which remove the connection between
a utility’s electricity sales volume and its revenue.
E. Impacts in the Northwest
The Northwest electric industry bears little semblance to the industries in Hawaii
or New York, and most of the factors driving those states towards comprehensive utility
reform are not present in the region. First, Northwestern states generally have among the
lowest electricity rates in the country. Second, the region contains a large number of
publicly-owned utilities, which are not under the jurisdiction of state regulators. Third,
DG penetration in the Northwest is limited, so utilities are not clamoring for cost-recovery
reforms to the same extent as in Hawaii. The Northwest, then, has the luxury of adopting
a “wait-and-see” approach to comprehensive utility reform.
However, Northwest states will likely have to pursue similar reforms eventually.
Federal and state policies, such as the federally-proposed Clean Power Plan, state RPS
goals, and widespread net metering programs, will drive the deployment of DERs. States
should avoid following a piecemeal approach to reform, which could create impacts that
frustrate public policy goals. For example, eliminating net-metering programs without
first establishing a robust rate design model will dampen development of DERs. Instead,
Northwestern states should monitor the reforms in Hawaii and New York and develop a
set of best practices to implement at an appropriate time.
F. Conclusion
Advances in renewable energy technologies and mounting concerns about climate
change are driving a transition in the U.S. electric industry, and Hawaii and New York
were among the first states to pursue comprehensive utility reforms to address these
169.

Id. at 6–15.
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changes. Regulators in both states proposed similar reforms to encourage the transition
to a modern electricity system, including creating entities to manage the distribution
system, facilitating customer engagement, and reforming the rate design and ratemaking
models to reflect new realities. Although the Northwest electric industry does not yet face
the same pressures as the industries in Hawaii and New York, Northwestern regulators
should monitor the reform processes in those states, and develop a set of best practices to
implement at an appropriate time.
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IX. TRANSITIONING FROM COAL TO CLEAN ENERGY IN THE WEST: THE
CLEAN POWER PLAN’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN GRID
AMELIA SCHLUSSER*********
In June 2014, EPA issued a draft rule to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from
existing electricity generating units in accordance with section 111(d) of the Clean Air
Act.170 This proposed rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), requires all states to
reduce carbon emissions rates from existing power plants by a specified percent below
2012 levels by 2030. In the western United States, these emission goals range from 19%
in Wyoming to 72% in Washington. EPA proposed for states to meet these targets
through a series of “building blocks,” which include increasing coal plant efficiencies,
replacing coal power with natural gas, increasing renewable energy generation, and
increasing energy efficiency.
The electricity needs of the western United States are served through the Western
Interconnection, which is an electrical grid spanning eleven states. As proposed, the CPP
will alter the generation mix in the west, which presents significant implications for the
grid. Western states currently generate more than 32,000 MW of electricity from coal. 171
Some western states are far more reliant on coal than others; for example, nearly 89% of
Wyoming’s electricity came from coal in 2013.172 Coal also played a significant role in
shaping the western transmission system. Coal-fired power plants are the primary
baseload resources in the intermountain west, and the transmission system was designed
to connect these plants to major cities. However, due to the CPP and other state and
federal policies, EPA anticipates significant coal plant retirements in the west between
2010 and 2024.173 The Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)174 projects that
8,643 MW of western coal generation will retire by 2025.175 Meanwhile, the CPP’s
renewable energy target for the west calls for the west to generate an additional
78,811,741 MWh from renewable resources by 2030.176
These anticipated changes in the west’s generation mix create challenges and
opportunities for transmission planning and grid modernization throughout the region.
On the one hand, the anticipated coal plant retirements will significantly reduce the west’s
baseload generating capacity, which may create reliability concerns for the grid. On the
*********
170.
171.
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Interconnection).
172. Wyoming: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
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175. WECC CPP REPORT, supra note 171, at 13, 16. These projections are based on known and
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176. GHG Abatement Measures, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION
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other hand, this presents an opportunity to replace polluting coal power with sustainable
renewable energy resources.
A. The Challenges: Transmission Constraints and Reliability Concerns
The western United States has the potential to generate more than enough
renewable energy to satisfy the CPP’s emission reduction requirements. However, there
are two primary challenges to deploying high levels of renewable energy over the western
grid. First, the west lacks the infrastructure necessary to connect remote, high-quality
renewable energy hubs to major load centers. Second, replacing baseload coal power with
variable renewable energy can create reliability and integration challenges. Fortunately,
these challenges are not insurmountable and they provide an opportunity to create a
sustainable, reliable grid.
1. Transmission Constraints
The Western Governors Association’s Western Renewable Energy Zones (WREZ)
initiative identified a number of “hubs” with access to high-value renewable energy.177
These WREZ hubs have the potential to provide all of the substitute energy required
under the proposed CPP, but a lack of transmission access impedes development at these
sites. Renewable energy developers generally are not interested in constructing projects
in remote areas unless transmission already exists or there is a high degree of certainty
that transmission will be constructed in the near future. Because many WREZ hubs are
in remote areas without transmission access, western states will need to expand and
optimize the grid to access these high-quality resources.
However, western grid expansion faces a number of hurdles. The main obstacles
for developing interstate transmission include 1) demonstrating that new transmission is
needed and in the public interest; 2) siting challenges, including inconsistent and
uncoordinated regulatory frameworks; and 3) cost allocation and recovery challenges.
These constraints present significant uncertainty for potential transmission developers
and make it difficult for developers to secure financing, obtain necessary approvals and
permits, and recover costs from ratepayers.
2. Reliability Concerns
Grid reliability depends on the transmission operator’s ability to balance load (i.e.
energy demand) and resource availability (i.e. generation) within the transmission system
at all times. The National Energy Regulatory Commission (NERC) recently issued an
Initial Reliability Review of the CPP, which expressed concerns that the rule could
compromise the reliability of the U.S. power grid.178 NERC’s concerns are premised on
the understanding that baseload resources inherently promote grid reliability and stability
by providing stable energy output to satisfy consumer energy demand. Variable
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renewable resources, such as wind or solar power, generally cannot adjust their output to
reflect changes in demand. Because grid operators must ensure that power levels in the
grid remain in balance at all times, managing variable renewable resources can be a
challenge.
Changes in the size or location of available generating resources make it difficult
for grid operators to maintain balance on the system. NERC’s Initial Reliability Review
warned that implementation of the proposed CPP may strain the grid’s “Essential
Reliability Services,” which are necessary to maintain balance between supply and
demand.179 These services include 1) generation and load balancing; 2) voltage stability;
and 3) frequency response. In the western grid, baseload coal plants help maintain voltage
stability within an acceptable range and respond to changes in frequency following
sudden losses of generation or load. Coal retirements in the region will reduce availability
of these reliability services. At the same time, increases in variable renewable generation
may require additional ramping of existing baseload resources, which could impose an
extra strain on existing resources.
The coal retirements called for under the proposed CPP may impose short-term
reliability constraints on the western grid, and increased deployment of variable
renewable resources will initially strain the flexibility of the grid. However, western states
can mitigate these challenges through a coordinated, strategic effort to modernize the
grid.
B. The Solutions: Modernizing the Grid
By promoting strategic transmission development, optimizing grid operations, and
deploying advanced technologies, western states can increase the capacity and efficiency
of the grid and effectively integrate large amounts of renewable energy onto the system.
These investments will enable the west to transition from coal-fired power to renewable
power without sacrificing grid reliability, stability, or flexibility.
Western states can incentivize strategic interstate transmission development by
implementing comprehensive transmission planning policies, coordinating siting
requirements, and revising cost allocation methods to incentivize optimal regional
development. First, states and transmission providers should engage in coordinated
planning to identify both new and existing transmission facilities that can meet the
region’s needs under the CPP.180 If this planning process identifies a need for new
transmission facilities, planners should prioritize development in areas that provide the
greatest access to high-quality renewable resources. Second, regulators should establish
a uniform, streamlined process for siting, approving, and constructing interstate
transmission lines. Third, regulators should establish cost allocation mechanisms to
apportion transmission costs fairly among all beneficiaries. 181
179. Id. at 2, 18.
180. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Order 1000 directs each public utility
transmission provider to participate in a regional transmission planning process that produces a regional
transmission plan. Order 1000, supra note 61.
181. FERC’s Order 1000 also requires the regional planning process to establish a regional cost
allocation method that allocates the costs of new regional or interregional transmission facilities among the
facility’s beneficiaries “in a manner that is at least roughly commensurate with the estimated benefits of that
facility in each of the transmission planning regions.” Id. at 589.
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Western states can effectively integrate high levels of renewable energy onto the
grid without compromising reliability by optimizing grid operations, implementing
advanced technologies, and adopting regional market-based mechanisms to increase
transmission efficiency. First, western states can optimize grid operations to balance
increasingly variable loads. This entails promoting geographically diverse resource
development, improving forecasting processes, implementing intra-hour scheduling,
improving reserve sharing, and enabling dynamic transfers between balancing areas.
Second, western states can deploy advanced technologies to increase transmission
capacity on existing lines. These technologies include smart grid-enabled demand
response, dynamic line rating systems, and increased deployment of energy storage,
distributed generation, and non-variable renewable resources. Finally, western states can
explore regional market-based approaches, such as Energy Imbalance Markets, that may
allow more efficient use of existing transmission by providing real-time access to unused
transmission capacity across the region.
C. Conclusion
Implementing the CPP will present a number of challenges for the western grid, yet
it also provides an opportunity to modernize and optimize the grid to accommodate more
sustainable energy resources. The grid is a highly interconnected system, and shifts in
one state’s resource mix may cause reliability issues in other states. Therefore, if states
choose to implement the CPP by themselves, the entire grid may suffer. Western states
should instead work together in a cooperative, collaborative manner to preemptively
address inevitable changes in the western resource mix. In doing so, states should
strategically invest in facilities, technologies, and operational practices that strengthen
the western grid as a whole and facilitate the transition to a clean, renewable energy
sector.

